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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
waived for services performed prior to termination of his contract.
Defendant asserted that this recovery should be further offset by the
value of time and expenses saved the plaintiff by his termination, as
in an action for breach of contract. The court rejected the contract
measure of damages as inapplicable to an intentional tort, but added:
"If defendants would offset the damages as claimed in the manner
asserted, the burden rested upon them to affirmatively allege and offer
proof upon such offset."8 This statement would suggest that savings
to an attorney of time and expense are deductible from his recovery
in an action for intentional interference. But an attorney's fee is
wholly composed of his time and expense; absent these items of re-
covery, an attorney would be limited to such items as damage to repu-
tation, loss of future earnings, and mental anguish. Despite the court's
recognition that "professional services... [comprehend] many intan-
gible values not wholly susceptible of proof,"9 the fact remains that
such damages would be extremely difficult to prove.
Regardless of the court's equivocal treatment of the issues of burden
of proof and measure of damages, the position of the court as regards
the integrity of the attorney-client relationship is clear. The decision
in the principal case can leave no doubt that third parties will not be
permitted to control the relationship between an attorney and his
client.
Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence as Proof of Libel Per Se.
The dubious distinction between libel per se and libel per quod may be
non-existent in Washington following a recent supreme court decision.
Plaintiff was divorced from his former wife, Hazel, on February 3,
1960. In September 1960, he married his present wife. Thereafter
plaintiff instituted a suit to modify the divorce decree. Defendant
newspaper, in reporting this suit, printed the following statement:
"Divorce Granted-Hazel M. Pitts from Phillip Pitts." Plaintiff sued
defendant for libel, alleging that considering extrinsic facts the publica-
tion was libelous per se; it gave the impression that plaintiff's second
marriage was illegal and that he was a bigamist. Defendant contended
that the publication was not libelous per se and that plaintiff could not
recover on the theory of a libel per quod since special damages had not
been pleaded. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in the court
below, held: False statements published in a newspaper concerning
81d. at 147, 396 P.2d at 154.
9 Id. at 147, 396 P.2d at 154.
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betrothals, marriages, births, divorces, and custody of children may be
shown to be libelous by proof of extrinsic circumstances and may thus
become actionable without proof of special damages. Pitts v. Spokane
Chronicle Co., 63 Wn.2d 763, 388 P.2d 976 (1963).
Libels may be divided into classes, words which are libelous on their
face, and words which, innocent on their face, are libelous only when
extrinsic and surrounding circumstances are considered.' Historically,
proof of special damages was not required in any action for libel whether
it was in the first or second class. Thus, "the question is libel or no
libel, and once it is determined that words are defamatory, damage is
presumed as a matter of substantive law."' This is the accepted rule
in England,' the position of the Restatement, and the rule in a minority
of American courts.5 A substantial number of courts, however, depart-
ing from the historical growth of the law of libel, have held that if a
publication is not libelous per se, plaintiff's recovery depends upon
proof of special damage.6 A libel which is not "libel per se" has been
called "libel per quod."
The Washington court from an early period has followed the doc-
trine that plaintiff's recovery depends upon allegation and proof of
special damages if a publication is not libelous per se." However, an
examination of the Washington case law quickly demonstrates that
there is no clear and consistent agreement as to what is meant by the
term "libelous per se."
S1 IHAiR & JAm.s, ToRTs § 5.9 (1956).
2 Ibid.
a Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 69 A.L.R. 720(1930).
4 RsTATrzMET, ToRTs § 569 (1934).5 E.g., Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis2d 452, 113 N.W2d 135 (1963);
Herrnmann v. Newark Morning Ledger, 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A2d 61 (1958); Upton
v. Times Democrat Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) ; Byram v. Aiken,
65 Minn. 87, 67 N.W. 807 (1896).
6 E.g., Brown v. National Home Ins. Co., 239 S.C. 488, 123 S.E2d 850 (1962);
Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959) ; Weaver v. Beneficial Fin.
Co, 200 Va. 572, 106 S.E.2d 620 (1959) ; Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 146 A2d 880
(1958) ; Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956) ; Broking v. Phoenix
Newspapers, 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P2d 413 (1953) ; Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co,
53 N.M. 145, 203 P2d 594 (1949) ; Creekmore v. Runnels, 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W2d
1007 (1949) ; Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co., 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580 (1943) ;
Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 113 Vt. 272, 34 A2d 99 (1943) ; Knapp v. Post
Printing Publishing Co., 11I Clo. 492, 144 P.2d 981 (1943) ; Towles v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 282 Ky. 147, 137 S.W2d 1110 (1940) ; Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280
N.W. 215 (1938) ; Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 68 N.D. 425, 280
N.W. 879 (1938); Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 174 Okl. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935);
Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933) ; Rachels v. Deener, 182 Ark.
931, 33 S.W2d 39 (1930) ; Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842 (1925);
Gustin v. Evening Press Co., 172 Mich. 311, 137 N.W. 674 (1912).7 Velikange v. Millichamp, 67 Wash. 138, 120 Pac. 876 (1912).
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In a leading case, Graham v. Star Publishing Co.,' the court held that
in order for a plaintiff to recover without proof of special damages, "the
defamatory matter must be certain and apparent from the words them-
selves."9 There is little merit in this rule that defamatory meaning
must unequivocally appear on the face of a publication without resort
to extrinsic circumstances. Since the interest to be protected is the
"reputation" of the individual, it should make no difference whether
the defamatory meaning of words appears on the face of the publication
or can be shown only by resort to extrinsic circumstances. In both
cases, the plaintiff has suffered injury to his reputation.
Moving away from this initial definition of libel per se, the Washing-
ton court stated, in Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc.,"0
A publication which tends to expose a living person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of benefit of public confidence or
social intercourse, or to injure him in his business or occupation, is
libelous per se .... The test actually is whether the language used con-
cerning a person and his affairs must from its nature, or presumably will
as its natural consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss.... The matter
of what constitues libel per se becomes, in many instances, a question
of fact for the jury. This is particularly true where the words relied
on as libelous per se depend upon innuendo or upon extrinsic circum-
stances .... "-
What does this test mean? It apparently means that words, innocent
on their face, may be shown to be "libelous per se" by reference to
"innuendo" or extrinsic circumstances. Thus the Graham rule seems
to be rejected. Any distinction between libel per se and libel per quod
seems to have been blurred away, because it is virtually impossible to
conceive of an actionable libel which does not fall within this broad
test of "libel per se. ''l
The definition of "libel per se," like the test, appears to cover the
whole field of defamatory publications. Thus, as used by the court in
Purvis, the term "libel per se" was useful only to describe a result,
namely, that recovery was allowed without proof of special damages.
In the principal case, the Washington court did not expressly reject
the libel per se-libel per quod distinction. The court restated the long-
standing Washington rule that alleged defamatory words must be
8 133 Wash. 387, 233 Pac. 625 (1925).
9 Id. at 389, 233 Pac. at 626.
10 54 Wn2d 743, 344 P.2d 705 (1959).
"154 Wn.2d 743, 751-52, 344 P.2d 705, 710-11 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
12 But cf., Schwartz v. World Publishing Co., 57 Wn.2d 213, 216, 356 P2d 97, 99
(1960) (Donworth, J., dissenting).
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libelous per se to permit recovery without proof of special damages1
Since the publication was held to be libelous per se, it was unnecessary
to prove special damages. However, after reciting the traditional
Washington rule, the court approved the English rule, and Restate-
ment of Torts § 569, " in which special damages need not be proved in
any action for libel. Thus, the court strongly indicated that the libel
per se-libel per quod distinction will be rejected in subsequent decisions.
Rejection of this purposeless and confusing distinction would indeed
be welcome.
TRADE REGULATION
Consumer Protection Act-Operation Under Federal Consent
Decree. In 1961 Washington joined those states which have enacted
comprehensive trade regulation statutes The Washington Supreme
Court recently sustained the constitutionality of this statute in an
opinion which suggests that the law will have an active future. The
state Attorney General brought an action to enjoin alleged monopoliza-
tion by certain motion picture distributors and theatre owners of second
run feature films in the Seattle area. The trial court sustained defend-
ants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
on grounds that Congress had preempted trade regulation of interstate
commerce, that the Washington act would interfere with and burden
interstate commerce, and that defendants were excluded from coverage
by the act's own terms. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed. Held: Federal antitrust statutes do not preempt the field of
trade regulation so as to prohibit state regulation of business activities
having sufficient local impact to justify exercise of state police power,
even though these activities are an incidental part of interstate com-
merce. Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act does not exempt
combined interstate and intrastate activities which are subject to regu-
lation-but not in fact regulated by-a federal officer, and does not
include operation under federal consent decrees within the meaning of
13 Velikange v. Millichanp, 67 Wash. 138, 120 Pac. 876 (1912).
14 Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 69 A.L.R. 720
(1930).
15 "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to
another m such a manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other
although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom."
I Consumer Protection Act., WAsH. Rsv. CODE ch. 19.86 (1961). The substantive
features and enforcement procedures of the act are detailed in Dewell & Gittenger, The
Washzngton Antitrust Laws, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 239 (1961).
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